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IT MIGHT BE YOURS THERE BUT IT’S NOT DOWN HERE 
ISSUES ARISING UNDER THE PPSA IN CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS  
 
STEPHANIE DERRINGTON 
 
As a relatively new piece of legislation, the Australian PPSA is yet to be 
the subject of much significant judicial consideration.  Whilst the position 
of the Australian courts is becoming clearer in relation to domestic 
disputes, parties to cross-border transactions continue to encounter an 
alarming number of uncertainties with respect to the enforcement and 
maintenance of their security interests. This article considers the relevant 
problematic provisions of the PPSA and considers them in light of the 
authorities dealing with corresponding legislation in other jurisdictions.  
It then attempts to provide some guidance and suggestions as to the best 
means of protecting security interests in cross-border transactions. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The conclusion of the transitional period for the Personal Property Securities Act 
2009 (Cth) (the PPSA) in January 2014 has heralded a fundamental change in 
Australian securities law. The change has been a deliberate choice of government 
which necessarily requires a recalibration of day-to-day business practice when it 
comes to creating and protecting security interests.  For purely domestic security 
transactions there is a useful developing body of Australian literature examining the 
general operation of the PPSA.  In general, the identification of the rules as to the 
applicable law to apply at any particular time are not overly complex.  However, 
where a transaction concerns the movement of goods between jurisdictions or 
involves a party located in a foreign jurisdiction, there is an alarming lack of authority 
as to the operation and effect of the Act. As this paper attempts to demonstrate, the 
international case law shows the paramount importance of understanding the effective 
enforcement of security interests in cross-border transitions. 
 
A consideration of the international jurisprudence suggests that the issues arising in 
cross-border transactions can be identified as belonging to one of two categories of 
cases.  First, which law is to be applied to characterize the nature of the interest which 
arises under a transaction?  That issue is anterior to determining whether or not the 
interest so created is a “security interest.”  Secondly, assuming that the transaction 
   
 2
gives rise to a security interest, how do the laws which determine questions of 
validity, perfection or non-perfection of security interests when goods are moved 
between jurisdictions apply?  In the absence of Australian judicial consideration of 
the relevant PPSA provisions, a number of concerning uncertainties remain for parties 
to cross-border transactions. An examination of the applicable PPSA provisions, 
accompanied by a consideration of the relevant international case law, may, however, 
provide some guidance, or at least some suggestion, of the approach the Australian 
courts will take to the application of the PPSA in cross-border transactions. 
 
II CONFLICT OF LAWS  
 
A Characterisation 
Fundamental to the application of the PPSA is the characterisation of the relevant 
legal interest as one which “in substance, secures payment or performance of an 
obligation.”1  That question will be determined, in part, by how the Court which 
determines any dispute, views the interest created under the contract.  Unlike in 
domestic transactions, where the characterisation of an interest can be determined as a 
question of fact by the straight-forward application of domestic law, the conflict of 
laws component of the issue in international transactions creates uncertainties.  
Relevantly, it is necessary to determine what law governs the characterisation of the 
interest in question. Is it the law of the contract, the lex situs or another law with some 
connection to the transaction? Unfortunately for contracting parties, there is a paucity 
of definitive authority on the issue. Indeed, even in jurisdictions such as Canada, 
where approaches to the PPSA are well established, there are a number of conflicting 
views between different jurisdictions.  As Justice Davies of the Federal Court noted in 
a 2014 paper, “whatever be the correct answer, questions of characterisation are often 
likely to be difficult and different minds may reasonably reach different 
conclusions.”2 Nevertheless, a consideration of the differing approaches is likely to be 
                                                 
1 Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Qld), s 12(1); Buckwold T, “The Conflict in Conflicts: 
Choice of Law in Canada – US Secured Financing Transactions” (2006) 21 Banking and Finance Law 
Review 407 at 412.  
2 Justice Davies, ‘Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth): objectives and emerging issues’ 
(Speech delivered at the National Commercial Law Series, Melbourne, 18 March 2014).  
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of some assistance to parties to cross-border transactions creating security interest 
which potentially fall within the ambit of the PPSA. 
 
It should be noted that questions of “characterization” of security interests is different 
to the question of the “validity” of a security interest which is created.  “Validity” 
involves the question of whether or not a security interest has been created.  
“Characterization”, on the other hand, involves the issue of how that interest is to be 
viewed by the Courts of the jurisdiction in which the dispute arises.  Historically, that 
question has been answered by reference to the proper law of the contract.  However, 
that rule has been much abused. This necessarily arises because financiers and the like 
will attempt to structure their agreements to avoid the operation of “foreign” Acts 
regulating security interests.  Additionally, the nature of interests arising under 
commercial agreements will differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction with some 
countries developing interests which incorporate concepts which are not familiar to 
Australian Courts or to the common law. 
 
Re Tunney (Tunney) (2000) BCSC 198,3 a 2000 decision of Master Bolton of the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, provides a useful summary of the conflicting 
Canadian decisions. That case involved competing claims to a motor vehicle that the 
bankrupt had leased from an Ontario dealer.  The parties identified the agreement as 
being a “true lease” of the vehicle.  The lease, which had been assigned by the dealer 
to Chrysler Credit, was registered in the Ontario PPSA registry. 4  Shortly after 
entering into the lease, the bankrupt moved to British Columbia and subsequently 
assigned his property “for the general benefit of creditors.”5 The trustee in bankruptcy 
rejected Chrysler Credit’s proof of claim on the basis that Chrysler Credit did not hold 
a security interest that was enforceable in British Columbia because of the lack of 
registration in that Province. Chrysler Credit argued that because the lease was a “true 
lease” entered into in Ontario, where registration of such leases is not required, it was 
not a “security interest” subject to the British Columbia Act. Whether the lease was a 
security interest in British Columbia depended on whether the interest was defined by 
Ontario law, being the law of the contract, or British Columbia law, being the law of 
                                                 
3 Overruled on a different point in Re Tunney (2000) 18 CBR (4th) 311.  
4 Although as a “true lease” this was not strictly necessary under the Ontario PPSA.  
5 Re Tunney (2000) 18 CBR (4th) 311 at [4]. 
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the jurisdiction in which the vehicle was located. Notwithstanding the existence of 
authority in favour of either approach, Master Bolton concluded that the weight of 
authority supported the trustee’s argument that the law of British Columbia applied, 
the effect being that Chrysler Credit’s claim to the vehicle was subordinated to the 
rights of the Trustee and creditors.  In concluding that characterization was to occur 
by reference to the law of the place of the location of the goods at the relevant time, 
his Honour drew attention to the ancient authority of Harrison v Sterry (1809) 5 
Cranch 289 where Marshall CJ held:  
“The law of the place where a contract is made is, generally speaking, 
the law of the contract – ie., it is the law by which the contract is 
expounded.  But the right of priority forms no part of the contract itself. 
It is extrinsic, and is rather a personal privilege dependent on the law of 
the place where the property lies, and where the Court sits which is to 
decide the cause.”6  
Although this passage had previously been relied upon to determine the law 
governing claims of priority,7 decisions such as Juckes v Hotel Chevrolet Oldsmobile 
Ltd (Juckes) (1990) 68 DLR (4d) 142 supported Master Bolton’s use of the authority 
for determining questions of characterisation.   
 
Interestingly, however, there is no consistency amongst the Canadian jurisdictions for 
the proposition that the law governing characterisation is the proper law of the 
contract. In Re Intex Moulding Ltd (1987) 57 OR (2d) 454 for example, Henry J 
concluded that the issue “may be treated like any other involving the interpretation of 
a contract involving several jurisdictions”8 such that the proper law of the contract 
determined the nature of the interest arising under the transaction.   That approach 
may have some merit in a federation where the “foreign” laws being applied are those 
of another Province or State which are fairly ascertainable and easily applied by the 
court of the lex situs.  That is not the same where the proper law of the contract is the 
law of an entirely foreign nation. 
 
The position in the United States is equally unclear. In The Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corp Ltd v HFH USA Corporation (HFH) (1992) 805 F.Supp. 133 
                                                 
6 Harrison v Sterry (1809) 5 Cranch 289 at 298. 
7 See, for example, Canron Inc v Ferrofab Ltd (1986) 7 BCLR (2d) 291.  
8 Re Intex Moulding Ltd (1987) 57 OR (2d) 454 at [17]. 
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(WDNY), the District Court of New York discussed the varying approaches to this 
question. Relevantly, in determining whether a claimed security interest (arising from 
a retention of title clause) was to be defined by the Uniform Commercial Code or 
German law, being the law of the contract, Skretny DJ stated:  
“If German law were applied under the present circumstances, it would 
violate a fundamental purpose of New York’s UCC Article 9: ‘to create 
commercial certainty and predictability by allowing third party 
creditors to rely on the specific perfection and priority rules that govern 
collateral within the scope of Article 9.”9 
However in 2008, the same court in Diesel Props SRL v Greystone Business Credit II 
LLC (2008) WL 594773 (SDNY) determined that the existence of a nature of the 
interest in question (again a retention of title clause) was to be determined by the law 
of the contract. Notably, the reasoning in that case suggests that there has not, in fact, 
been a departure from the approach adopted in HFH. Indeed, HFH was distinguished 
only on the basis that the relevant third party financier was not a stranger to the 
agreement under which the security interest arose and commercial certainty was, 
therefore, not in issue.10  This approach adopted in New York has the result that much 
will turn on whether or not the third party, which seeks to trump the security created 
under the original foreign agreement, was aware of the existence of the creation of the 
security interest under that security.  This produces little certainty as it means that 
cases will be determined on the basis of the evidence relating to the knowledge of one 
of the parties to the dispute, something which the system under the PPSA had sought 
to avoid. 
 
Given the inherent difficulties with the application of foreign laws in domestic courts 
and, indeed, for pragmatic reasons of commercial certainty and predictability in cross-
border transactions, it would seem logical for the Australian courts to also determine 
questions of characterisation in accordance with the lex situs of the goods when the 
dispute arises and where the Court determining the dispute sits.  For Australian Courts 
                                                 
9 The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd v HFH USA Corporation (1992) 805 F.Supp. 133 
(WDNY) at 141.  
10 Diesel Props SRL v Greystone Business Credit II LLC (2008) WL 594773 (SDNY) at 3 citing The 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd v HFH USA Corporation 805 F.Supp. 133 (WDNY 1992) 
at 140. 
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that is the law of Australia.11    In almost all instances, this would mean that the 
question of characterizing the type of interest which the parties purported to create 
would be determined by the application of Australian law applied to the rights and 
obligations under the contract in question. This approach correlates with the relevant 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade.12   
 
B Governing law 
The characterisation of the nature of the interest does not, in many cases of cross-
border transactions, settle the entirety of the conflict of law issues.  Indeed, the nature 
of securities law can result in the application of different laws to the various aspects 
of a problem.13  In this respect difficult issues arise in determining whether or not the 
identified interest is valid, has been perfected and the effect of that “perfection.” 
 
It seems a universal proposition that the provisions governing the determination of 
such issues 14  are not well drafted and their application is problematic and, in 
particular, in relation to goods which are normally moved between jurisdictions.  
Moreover, added confusion arises because the conflict of laws provisions use the 
expression “security interest” which is defined in PPSA s 12, in a way that extends its 
operation beyond those interests which are within the defined meaning.  This was 
considered at some length by Blair JA in GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. – Canada 
v TCT Logistics Inc  (GMAC) (2004) 238 DLR (4th) 487, 15  where his Honour 
considered the Ontario PPSA equivalent of PPSA s 238(3).  His Honour held:  
“Where s. 7(1) is concerned, the first consideration is not to determine 
whether the transaction under review created a security interest, as 
defined in the…PPSA. It is to determine whether the dispute gives rise 
to a question regarding the validity, perfection or the effect of 
perfection or non-perfection of a security interest in the relevant type of 
                                                 
11 Explanatory Memorandum, Personal Property Securities Bill 2009 (Cth), 7.1; UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, Part X. 
12 United National Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, Articles 1 – 5, 
note especially that Article 5(g) defines “priority” to include the determination of whether or not a right 
is a security right for indebtedness or another obligation. 
13 Catzman F, Personal Property Security Law in Ontario (1st ed, Thomson Carswell, 1976) pp 40 cited 
in Re Intex Moulding Ltd (1987) 57 OR (2d) at 454. 
14 See Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), Part 7.2 and, in particular, s 238. 
15 Unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court on a different point in GMAC Commercial Credit 
Corp. – Canada v TCT Logistics Inc (2006) 271 DLR (4th) at 193. 
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equipment or inventory, and, if it does, then to apply the choice of law 
provisions to determine the proper law governing the resolution of that 
dispute. In this context, ‘security interest’ is not confined to security 
interest as defined in the…PPSA.” 
His Honour was compelled to reach this conclusion because conformity and harmony 
with other securities legislation is necessary for the purposes of ensuring 
predictability.16  It is a well-accepted axiom relating to the various pieces of PPSA 
legislation that their conflict of laws provisions not only create “uniformity, certainty 
and clarity in the application of personal property security law” but importantly, also 
“ensure that a type of renvoi [does] not occur, such that two jurisdictions might defer 
jurisdiction to one another perpetually, leaving a jurisdictional vacuum.”17  Despite 
that laudable aim, as is shown below, many difficulties can arise in the application of 
the provisions.  
 
The general position through Canada, New Zealand and Australia to goods generally 
is that the law governing the validity or perfection of security interests is determined 
by reference to the location of the relevant collateral at the time of attachment.  
However, where the goods are, inter alia, “of a kind that is normally used in more 
than one jurisdiction”18 different rules apply.  Section 238 of the PPSA provides:  
“     Main rules 
(1) The validity of a security interest in goods is governed by the law of 
the jurisdiction (other than the law relating to conflict of laws) in 
which the goods are located when the security interest attaches, 
under that law, to the goods.  
 
… 
 
 Goods that are moved  
(2) Despite subsections (1) and (1a), the validity, perfection and the 
effect of perfection or non-perfection, of a security interest in 
goods is governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction (the 
destination jurisdiction), other than the law relating to the 
conflict of laws, if:  
                                                 
16 GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. – Canada v TCT Logistics Inc  (2004) 238 DLR (4th) 487 at [21]. 
17 Buckwold, n 1 at 435.  
18 Personal Property Securities Acts (Canada), ss 5, 7; Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (NZ), ss 
26, 30; Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), ss 238(1), 238(3). 
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(a) at the time (the attachment time) the security 
interest attaches, under that law, to the goods, it 
was reasonable to believe that the goods would 
be moved to the destination jurisdiction; and  
(b) the goods are currently located in the destination 
jurisdiction.  
 
  Goods that are normally moved between jurisdictions  
(3) Despite subsections (1) to (2A), the validity perfection, and the 
effect of perfection or non-perfection, of a security interest in 
goods is governed by the law of a jurisdiction (including the law 
relating to conflict of laws) if:  
(a) the grantor is located in that jurisdiction when the 
security interest attaches under that law, to the 
goods; and  
(b) the goods are of a kind that is normally used in 
more than one jurisdiction; and  
(c) the goods are not used predominantly for 
personal, domestic or household purposes.” 
 
The judgment of MacLean of the Saskatchewan Court of the Queen’s Bench in 
Trailmobile Canada Ltd v Kindersley Transport Ltd (Trailmobile) (1986) 7 PPSAC 
75 provides an enlightening commentary on the intention of the legislature with 
respect to the relevant conflict of laws provisions.19 His Honour notes that in drafting 
ss 5 and 7 of the Canadian PPSAs (equivalent to ss 238(1) and 238(3) PPSA), the 
legislature contemplated two situations, differing in respect of the type of collateral 
involved.20 Relevantly, s 5 is said to apply to “goods” in the general sense whereas s 7 
applied to most goods “of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction.” 
Importantly, however, Maclean J also highlighted that the application of s 7 requires 
the determination of three individual and discrete factors:  
1. where the debtor is located (in accordance with the definition in s 7(1));  
2. whether the goods are of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction; 
and  
3. whether the goods are equipment or inventory held for lease by a debtor to 
others.21 
                                                 
19 Trailmobile Canada Ltd v Kindersley Transport Ltd (1986) 7 PPSAC 75 at [19]-[26]. 
20 Trailmobile Canada Ltd v Kindersley Transport Ltd (1986) 7 PPSAC 75 at [19].  
21 Trailmobile Canada Ltd v Kindersley Transport Ltd (1986) 7 PPSAC 75 at [20].  
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Although the third element differs from the requirement in PPSA s 238(3)(c) that “the 
goods are not used predominately for personal, domestic or household purposes,” the 
discussion in Trailmobile appears to correlate with the intention evinced by the 
Australian legislature in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Personal Property 
Securities Bill 2009 (Cth). 22  Importantly, that memorandum makes clear the 
requirements for all elements of s 238(3)(c) PPSA to be satisfied:  
“7.26 This exception to the main rule takes into consideration the 
requirement for sufficient connecting factors to the governing 
law and the reasonable expectation of the parties that for mobile 
commercial property the location of the goods at any particular 
time should not dictate what law will apply to the security 
interests.” 
 
Although the operation of PPSA s 238(3) is yet to be examined in any great detail in 
Australia, a number of applicable principles can be extracted from international 
decisions and other domestic case law. However, in a practical sense, if the position 
under PPSA s 238 is unclear and the involved foreign jurisdiction also has a scheme 
of registration, it would seem prudent to register an interest in both Australia and the 
foreign jurisdiction. This would ensure the existence of protection, regardless of the 
outcome of a determination of governing law.  That said, it is apparent that this 
prudent approach is not always adopted. 
 
1 Goods of a kind normally used in more than one jurisdiction   
Importantly, it should be noted that the test in PPSA s 238(3)(b) contemplates an 
objective consideration of the relevant goods. As was discussed in Gimli Auto Ltd and 
Eagle Ridge Pontiac Buick GMC v BDO Dunwoody Ltd (trustee) and Canada 
Campers Inc (Gimli) (1998) ABCA 154, the issue arising under the correlative 
section is not how the particular goods in question are used, or are intended to be 
used, but how such goods in general are “normally used.” Indeed, how the parties 
intend to use the goods in question is irrelevant to a question of governing law.   
 
Gimili involved a priority dispute between two lessors and the trustee in bankruptcy 
of the lessee, BDO. The trustee in bankruptcy challenged the claims of the two 
                                                 
22 Explanatory Memorandum, Personal Property Securities Bill 2009 (Cth), 7.20-7.27. 
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lessors, Gimil Auto Ltd (Gimli Auto) and Eagle Ridge Pontiac Buick GMC (Eagle 
Ridge), on the basis that Alberta law applied and their interests had not been 
registered in that province.  BDO carried on the business of renting tucks to tourists 
under relatively short-term leases entered into in Alberta. The trucks leased to tourists 
had been rented from Gimli pursuant to a long-term lease entered into in the Canadian 
province of Manitoba.  At the relevant time, the law of Manitoba did not require an 
owner to register its interest under a pure lease and accordingly, the long term lease 
was never registered. BDO had leased a passenger motor vehicle from Eagle Ridge. 
That vehicle was leased and used in British Columbia, where the lease was also 
registered.   
 
To determine which party or parties had priority to the trucks and motor vehicle, the 
Alberta Court of Appeal was required to determine the applicable Provincial law. It 
was accepted that if Alberta law applied, the trustee’s claim would prevail as 
Alberta’s PPSA required registration of interests and neither Gimli Auto nor Eagle 
Ridge had registered their interests.  Conversely, if the applicable law was that of 
Manitoba and British Columbia respectively, the claims of Gimli Auto and Eagle 
Ridge would take priority. Gimli Auto’s because no registration was required and 
Eagle Ridge’s because it had registered under the British Columbia PPSA.  
 
In holding in favour of the trustee that the law of Alberta applied, Côtê J (with whom 
Bracco and Conrad JJ agreed), carefully considered the operation s 7 of the Alberta 
PPSA. His Honour concluded that the trucks and motor vehicle were goods “of a kind 
normally used in more than one jurisdiction.” That the trucks and motor vehicle were 
only used in Alberta and British Columbia respectively was irrelevant as, at least in 
Canada, “motor vehicles [and trucks] cross every border thousands of time a 
day…Almost every sedan crosses Provincial, State or National borders in its 
operational life.”23  The necessary consequence of it having also been determined that 
the trucks and motor vehicle also satisfied the test relating to “equipment or inventory 
                                                 
23 Gimli Auto Ltd and Eagle Ridge Pontiac Buick GMC v BDO Dunwoody Ltd (trustee) and Canada 
Campers Inc (1998) ABCA 154 at [20].  
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held for lease by a debtor to others,”24 was that the applicable law was the law of 
Alberta, Alberta being the location of the debtor.   
 
Canadian cases such as Gimili and GMAC raise an interesting question in the context 
of the Australian PPSA as to whether the goods in question have to be of a kind that, 
in Australia, are “normally used in more than one jurisdiction.” As a result of the 
national operation of the PPSA in Australia, as opposed to the provincial operation of 
each Canadian Act, there is a significantly lower occurrence of regular, “day-to-day” 
collateral border crossings to and from Australia.25  
 
However, whether the result of the above is that most goods used in Australia are not 
of a kind “normally used in more than one jurisdiction” is unclear. On the one hand, it 
could reasonably be argued that only goods regularly moved into and out of Australia, 
such as planes, shipping containers and vessels, satisfy the test. However, as conflict 
of laws legislation is designed to “facilitate doing business in more than one 
jurisdiction,” 26  it appears equally arguable than a more “international” approach 
should be taken to the interpretation of the test. If the latter view is accepted, security 
interests over goods that, internationally, are “normally used in more than one 
jurisdiction” would be caught by the operation of PPSA s 238(3) even though in 
Australia, the goods do not ordinarily leave the jurisdiction. The UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions and an earlier version of the Uniform 
Commercial Code suggest that such goods may include motor vehicles, rolling stock, 
road building and construction machinery and commercial harvesting equipment.27 
This approach appears to correlate with the view expressed by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in GMAC,28 in which it was stated that conflict of laws provisions should be 
interpreted in the context of their governing of multi-jurisdictional disputes.29 Indeed, 
as a matter of “commercial stability and certainty in a fluid [international] 
                                                 
24 This is irrelevant for the purposes of a consideration of the Australian PPSA as there is no equivalent 
section.  
25 Taylor J, “Retention of Title and the Trans-Tasman Supply of Goods” (2006) 12 New Zealand 
Business Law Quarterly 71.  
26 (1998) ABCA 154 at [16]. 
27 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, Part X; Uniform Commercial Code, s 9-
103(3)(a) as at 1998.  
28 See, for example, Duggan A and Brown D, Australian Personal Property Securities Law (1st ed, 
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012) pp 14.27.  
29 GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. – Canada v TCT Logistics Inc (2006) 271 DLR (4th) 193 at [21]. 
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economy,”30 an international approach to interpretation would seem logical. To the 
extent that there may be some certainty with respect to the relevant Australian law, 
this approach is likely to be advantageous to an Australian debtor who would have the 
benefit of being able to rely on the law of its own jurisdiction.    
 
3 Goods not used “predominantly for personal, domestic or household 
purposes”   
Although there is an abundance of judicial consideration concerning the interpretation 
of phrases similar to that in PPSA s 238(3)(c), such authorities suggest that it would 
be misconceived to approach the provision with any less uncertainty or caution than 
the provisions it accompanies.  However, if the necessary care is taken when 
translating authorities between similar provisions,31 the existing Australian case law 
can be seen as a “guide” to the potential interpretation of PPSA s 238(3)(c).   
 
Importantly, the negative nature of s 238(3)(c) should be noted. Unlike legislation 
such as the Australian Consumer Law and the Sales Tax (Exemptions and 
Classifications) Ac 1935 (Cth), s 238(3)(c) is concerned with goods not 
predominantly used for personal domestic or household purposes. It is the phrase “not 
used predominantly” that appears likely to cause the most controversy.  On the one 
hand, it could be argued that the section does not exclude goods ordinarily, commonly 
or regularly used for personal, domestic or household purposes if that is not their 
principal method of use.32 However, the better view seems to be that, in accordance 
with the “policy and purposes” of the PPSA,33 the word “predominantly” should be 
interpreted as meaning goods “whose primary but not necessarily exclusive purpose 
and customary use” is for personal, domestic or household reasons.34 Accordingly, 
PPSA s 238(3)(c) would exclude those goods which, although capable of other uses, 
are primarily used for personal, domestic or household reasons. This approach 
appears to accord with the Act’s distinguishing of consumer and non-consumer 
                                                 
30 GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. – Canada v TCT Logistics Inc (2006) 271 DLR (4th) 193 at [20]. 
31 Bunnings Group Ltd v Laminex Group Ltd (2006) 153 FCR 479 at [77]. 
32 Bunnings Group Ltd v Laminex Group Ltd (2006) 153 FCR 479 at [81]; Clean Investments Pty Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 105 FCR 248 at [97]; Hygienic Lily Ltd v Deputy 
Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 13 FCR 396 at 499-400.  
33 Bunnings Group Ltd v Laminex Group Ltd (2006) 153 FCR 479 at [81]. 
34 ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Victoria) (1987) 87 ATC 
5110 at 5112. 
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goods35 and ensures that contracts and security agreements over consumer goods 
brought in a foreign jurisdiction continue to be governed by the foreign law.36 
 
4 The efficacy of contractual "choice of law" clauses  
In Re Cohoon (Cohoon) (2006) NSSC 30, Cregan R made what appears to be an 
emphatic statement as to the ability of parties to a cross-border transaction to bind 
third parties to an elected choice of law clause. After considering a wide range of 
authorities, his Honour stated:  
“The cases clearly state that the parties are not at liberty to bind a third 
party to their choice of some other law to its detriment. A third party is 
entitled to rely on the law of the situs, in this case, as expressed in the 
PPSA.”37 
 
The decision in Cohoon contemplated facts similar to those in Gimli. Cohoon, the 
bankrupt, had entered into a lease of a motor vehicle in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding 
that the lease was signed in Nova Scotia, it stated that it was executed in Quebec and 
contained a choice of law clause in favour of the law of Quebec. The lease was not 
registered in Nova Scotia. Following the bankrupt’s assignment of interests to the 
trustee in bankruptcy, Park Avenue Leasing Ltd (Park Avenue), the applicant, filed a 
proof of claim. The trustee rejected the applicant’s claim on the basis that the lease 
had not been registered in Nova Scotia.   
 
On appeal, Park Avenue sought to rely on the choice of law clause in the lease to 
establish that parties were governed by the law of Quebec. This position was 
favourable to Park Avenue as Quebec law did not require perfection (by registration) 
to protect its claim to the motor vehicle. On the other hand, the trustee argued, for two 
reasons, that the correct governing law was that of Nova Scotia. Firstly, it submitted 
that as the enforcement of a security party’s right against collateral is a procedural, as 
opposed to substantive, issue, s 9(1) of the Nova Scotia PPSA dictated that that the 
applicable law was the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral was located 
when the rights are exercised. Secondly, it was submitted that even if the issue was 
substantive and could therefore be determined in accordance with the proper law of 
                                                 
35 Explanatory Memorandum, Personal Property Securities Bill 2009 (Cth), 4.10-4.12. 
36 Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), ss 238(1) and 238(3). 
37 Re Cohoon (2006) NSSC 30 at [25]. 
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the contract,38 the proper law of the contract was that of Nova Scotia because the 
agreement to chose Quebec law was not bona fide.39 
 
Before considering the relevant case law, Cregan R usefully summarised the issue in 
question, highlighting the particular concerns arising in secured transactions. His 
Honour stated:  
“Can a financial company in the business of essentially providing 
financing for the acquiring of automobiles or other large items override 
the provisions of the PPSA making such arrangements ineffective against 
trustees by requiring the lessees, borrowers, or whatever they may be 
called depending on the nature of the financing documents to agree that 
the personal property security law of another jurisdiction whose 
provisions are easier for it shall apply, not just as between the parties to 
the document but also to others not privy to it, such as other creditors, 
secured or unsecured, trustees in bankruptcy, liquidators, sheriffs, 
etc.?”40 
His Honour added, “I think not.”41 Retreating from the position in Vita Food Products 
Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 that an express choice of law clause is 
enforceable “provided the intention expressed is bona fide and legal and provided 
there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy,”42 Cregan R 
held that “the courts do not have to follow what the parties have agreed to with 
respect to the proper law.”43  
 
The High Court’s approach to choice of law clauses,44 and the fact that the PPSA 
“does not affect the law that governs contractual obligations (including any 
obligations arising under a security agreement),”45 suggests that the Australian courts 
will also protect a third party’s right to rely on the law of the lex situs.46 In the context 
of cross-border transactions, such an approach will mean that whilst parties can, 
between themselves, rely on a contractual choice of law clause to apply the law of a 
                                                 
38 Personal Property Securities Act (Nova Scotia), s 9(1). 
39 See, for example, Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277. 
40 Re Cohoon (2006) NSSC 30 at [15]. 
41 Re Cohoon (2006) NSSC 30 at [15].  
42 Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 at [12]. 
43 Re Cohoon (2006) NSSC 30 at [25]. 
44 See, for example, Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197; Akai Pty 
Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418. 
45 Personal Property Securities Act 2011 (Cth), s 234(2). 
46 Re Cohoon (2006) NSSC 30 at [23]. 
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foreign jurisdiction, the clause will be ineffective when a bona fide third party is 
involved. Notwithstanding the courts’ concern to give effect to the express intention 
of contracting parties,47 this approach appears to be the only way to achieve the 
desired “commercial certainty” desired by the legislature when drafting the PPSA.48 
 
III CONTINUING PROTECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS   
 
As discussed, the Canadian case law gives some indication as to the type of PPSA 
litigation likely to arise in Australia. A matter of the upmost importance for parties to 
cross-border transactions is the continued enforcement of a security interest in the 
event that the goods are moved between jurisdictions.  The significance of such rules 
has been discussed by Grieve who states:  
“if [a] secured party foresees or becomes aware of any change of location 
of the collateral or the debtor…, consideration must be given as to 
whether the security interest is properly perfected in the new jurisdiction, 
and whether any further enforceability or priority issues may come into 
play in any of the jurisdictions whose laws may be relevant.”49 
  
Relevantly, PPSA s 39, which applies to all collateral, not just that collateral caught 
by s 238, provides:  
“(1) A security interest in collateral that has been located in a 
jurisdiction (the foreign jurisdiction) outside Australia, and is 
relocated to Australia, is taken to have been continuously 
perfected for the period covered in subsection (2) if, immediately 
before the collateral became located in Australia, and at the time 
it became so located:  
(a) the security interest was effective; and  
(b) the security agreement providing for the security 
interest was enforceable against third parties.” 
 
Subsection 2 relates to the period between when the security interest became 
perfected, registered or enforceable against third parties under the law of a foreign 
                                                 
47 BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd v Oil Basins Ltd [1985] VR 756 at 759.  
48 See, for example, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 June 2009, 
6960-6963 (Robert McClelland); Explanatory Memorandum, Personal Property Securities Bill 2009 
(Cth). 
49 Greive D, “Cross-Border Security Interests: Choice of Law in Canada” (2011) 44(1) Uniform 
Commercial Code Law Journal Art 3.  
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jurisdiction and when the relevant property becomes located in Australia. More 
importantly, however, PPSA s 39(3) provides for the temporary perfection of security 
interests over goods moved into Australia. Relevantly, that section states:  
“(3) If a security interest in collateral is continuously perfected under 
subsection (1), the security interest in the collateral is temporarily 
perfected for the period:  
(a) starting at the time the property becomes located 
in Australia; and 
   (b) ending at the earlier of the following times:  
(i) the end of 56 business days after 
the day the collateral becomes 
located in Australia;  
(ii) the end of 5 business days after the 
day the secured party has actual 
knowledge that the collateral has 
become located in Australia.” 
The governing law, as determined by PPSA s 238 will determine whether a security 
interest was in fact effective and enforceable against third parties in a foreign 
jurisdiction at the time it becomes located in Australia. There is Canadian case law to 
suggest that some issue may arise as to when goods “become located in Australia.”  
 
Although this is likely to be less of an issue in Australia due to the absence of regular 
border crossings, it is useful to consider the approach of the Canadian courts. 
Relevantly, in Re Steed (2001) 22 CBR (4th) 148 Funduk M held that “the test is not a 
residency test” or a test of when the party holding the collateral feels “finally 
settled.”50 Rather, the question is to be determined as a matter of common sense, 
considering the whole of the circumstances of the relocation.51 As his Honour stated, 
“no one would likely seriously argue that the British Columbian who comes into 
Alberta on a 10 day motoring holiday has ‘brought’ his automobile within the context 
of [the PPSA].”52 
 
However, in light of the lower occurrence of regular collateral border crossings in 
Australia, secured parties should be aware that the time period specified in PPSA s 
39(3) is likely to almost always commence on the date the relevant goods enter 
                                                 
50 Re Steed (2001) 22 CBR (4th) 148 at [12].  
51 Re Steed (2001) 22 CBR (4th) 148 at [7].  
52 Re Steed (2001) 22 CBR (4th) 148 at [7]. 
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Australia. As the temporary perfection period created by PPSA s 39(3) is less 
generous than the period allowed in other PPSA jurisdictions, 53  prudent parties 
holding a security interest over goods which are outside of Australia should ensure 
that they remain aware of the whereabouts of the goods and immediately register in 
Australia should they become aware that the goods have entered the country.  
 
IV CONCLUSION  
 
As appears from the above discussion, the operation of the PPSA in cross-border 
transactions can have an extremely detrimental impact on an unprepared, or unaware 
party. From questions as to whether a particular interest is caught by the Act, through 
to the practicalities of the continued protection of a security interest, a multi-
jurisdictional securities transaction gives rise to a number of issues which do not 
occur in domestic transactions. Unfortunately for a secured party, there are 
accordingly an increased number of stages at which priority or an interest in the 
relevant collateral can be lost.  Notwithstanding the uncertainties currently existing 
under the Australian legislation, it would appear that parties to cross-border 
transactions can take a number of steps to ensure the best possible protection of a 
security interest. These steps may include registering an interest in more than one 
jurisdiction and the close monitoring of the whereabouts of secured collateral. 
However, in the absence of any significant litigation or judicial hinting as to the 
approach of the Australian courts, the abovementioned uncertainties are likely to 
remain a point of difficulty and concern in cross-border transactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Personal Property Securities Acts (Can), ss 5(3) and 7(3); Personal Property Securities Act 1999 
(NZ), s 27. 
